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COUNTRY RISK AND THE INTERNATIONAL FLOWS OF TECHNOLOGY: 





We  empirically  investigate  the  relationship  between  country  risk  and  the  international  flows  of 
technology. Using a comprehensive database on investments in chemical plants during the period 1981-
1991,  we  show  that  higher  levels  of  country  risk  are  associated  with  fewer  technology  transfers  to 
recipient  economies.  This  holds  true  both  for  wholly  owned  operations  and  for  more  market-based 
transactions. The analysis also suggests that technology transfers with smaller resource commitment tend 
to be preferred in country with higher levels of risk. Hence, higher country risk not only does it reduce the 
amount of wholly owned investment, it also contributes to shift from this type of technology transfer to 
more market-mediated means, such as licensing. After controlling for several country characteristics, we 
do  not  find  intellectual  property  rights  protection  playing  a  significant  role  in  fostering  technology 
transfers or conditioning the transfer mode.
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Introduction
The past decade has been marked by the increasing importance of international technology flows. 
The 1999 World Investment Report shows that the worldwide flow of foreign direct investment 
has passed $600 billion in 1998. Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001) have stressed the 
increased importance of market-based transactions for technology in the last two decades of the 
XX century. Cross-border alliances and joint ventures have become widespread in the last few 
years.
As the need to exploit technological assets on a global scale becomes more and more imperative, 
companies as well as governments seeking to attract international technology must have a good 
understanding of trends in technology flows. In this paper we shall focus on one important, and 
yet not very well studied, factor affecting international technology flows, namely country risk.
During the 90s some countries have experienced important differences in their idiosyncratic risk. 
Countries like Yugoslavia and Iraq have more than doubled their level of risk. Similarly, 
countries like Indonesia, Cameroon, Pakistan and Algeria have experimented very significant 
increases. On the other side, Poland, El Salvador, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama have more than 
halved their level of country risk.
1
Firms, and managers in particular, seem to put a lot of attention on the changes of investment 
conditions in different countries. Anecdotal facts suggest that rises in country-specific risk have 
an immediate effect on international investment which is often considered footloose and ready to 
move to safer places. The proliferation of country ratings, which should serve as an aid to 
decision-making in the assessment of country risks, provides other evidence of the close 
relationship between international investment and country-specific risk. 
The purpose of this paper is to offer a closer look at the impact of country risk on the inflow of 
international technology. We distinguish between three modes of international technology 
transfer: wholly owned operations, joint-ventures and licensing. We account for the simultaneity 
of the technology transfer decision. In addition, we estimate the relative effect of country risk on 
wholly owned operations, licensing and joint-ventures.2
Our results suggest that the net effect of an increase of country risk is a reduction of the flow of 
technology into the recipient country. We also find that changes in country risk affect the 
composition (not only the volume) of international technology transfer since firms tend to 
respond to higher levels of risk by adopting modes of technology transfers, such as licensing, 
which involve less resource commitment.
Finally, we also contribute to the huge debate on the importance of policies aimed at stricter 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Advocates of these policies argue that stronger 
IPRs protection would enhance technology flows and foreign downstream investment in the 
recipient countries, that, via spillovers, could favor the technological catch-up of less developed 
countries. Unfortunately, our results suggest that, at least for the chemical industry, international 
technology flows do not seem to be sensitive to the protection of IPRs. Moreover, contrary to 
what has been purported by the theoretical literature, stronger IPRs do not even affect the 
composition of international technology flows.
1.  Related Literature, Contribution and Limitations
The main contribution of this paper is to underscore the relationship between country-specific 
risk and the international flows of technology. There is an empirical literature focussed on 
country risk as an explanatory factor for the amount of foreign direct investment in a given 
country. However, little is known about other means through which technology is typically 
transferred internationally, namely joint-ventures and licensing. In addition, we shall account for
the simultaneous effects of country risk on wholly owned operations, joint-ventures and 
licensing, and we shall provide empirical results on the relative effects as well.
One of the first studies which has focused on the relationship between risk and foreign direct 
investment is Flamm (1984). He estimates an equation relating multinational electronics 
investments to relative wages, using country-specific dummy variables as proxies for differential 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 These figures are obtained by comparing the Institutional Investor credit ratings (IICR) of the different countries at 
the beginning of the year 1990 and at the end of 1999. See later for details on the IICR.3
risk. His results seem to suggest that firms are very much concerned with having a balanced risky 
portfolio so they respond quickly to changes in country risk.
Wheeler and Mody (1991) also investigate the impact of country-specific risk on foreign direct 
investment. They measure risk as a first principal component extracted from a set of indices 
which measure political stability, inequality, corruption, red tape, quality of the legal system, 
cultural compatibility, attitude toward foreign capital and general expatriate comfort. They find 
that firms seem to assign little importance to perceived risk, except for some modest weight 
attached to geopolitical considerations.
A bunch of studies on foreign direct investment in emerging markets has put particular stress on 
indicators of economic and political risk (Lucas, 1993; Jun and Singh, 1996; Holland and Pain, 
1998). A recent paper by Bevan and Estrin (2000) using a panel data set containing information 
on foreign direct investment flows from 18 market economies to 11 transition economies over the 
period 1994-1998 finds that foreign direct investment inflows are strongly influenced by country 
risk, among other factors.
Our paper shows that the whole flow of technology transfer into a recipient economy is negative 
related to the level of country risk. Moreover, this effect holds for all technology transfer modes 
considered in our analysis, namely wholly owned operations, joint-ventures and licensing. 
Finally, we are also able to show that the relative effect is stronger for technology transfer modes 
which involve greater commitment with the recipient country, such as wholly owned operations. 
In sum, higher levels of country risk mean less technology transfer, that tends to be more market-
based.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on international technology transfers and 
IPRs protection. Several papers have focussed on the link between IPRs and trade. (Among 
others, see for instance Maskus and Penubarti, 1995, and Smith, 1999.)4
nship between IPRs and foreign direct investment. The results have been mixed. For instance, 
Mansfield and Lee (1996), using a survey index for sixteen developing and newly industrialized 
countries, report a positive and significant impact of IPRs on foreign direct investment flows. 
However, Fink (1997), using US foreign direct investment in 42 countries in a gravity-type 
model, shows that, if at all, the link between IPRs and multinational activity is negative. Few 
studies have addressed the link between other means of technology transfers and IPRs. A notable 
exception is Fink (1997) which reports a weak positive relationship between IPRs and licensing 
activity. Finally, Ferrantino (1993), Maskus (1998) and Smith (2001) provide the only previous 
empirical studies that link IPRs with simultaneous decisions about servicing.  Smith (2001) 
shows that IPRs have a positive and significant effect both on foreign direct investment and 
licensing, but no effect on exports. The effect is more pronounced for licensing and tends to be 
stronger in countries with strong imitative abilities, supporting the idea of IPRs generating a 
market expansion effect.
2
In our paper we cannot find any significant relationship between the strength of IPRs protection 
and the flows of technology transfer, whatever is the mode chosen by the investor. In addition, 
we do not find any indication of market expansion effect or market power effect due to stronger 
IPRs. Since the chemical industry is a prototypical example of R&D-based industry, our results 
seem to confirm Maskus and Penubarti (1995)’s finding that the most patent-sensitive industries 
are, on average, unaffected by the scope of protection.
3
One virtue of our paper vis-à-vis the rest of the related literature is that we have very detailed 
plant level information. This allows us to study firms’ decisions concerning the preferred mode 
of technology transfer and show how and if our explanatory variables affect firms’ choices. 
However, two important limitations should be put upfront: first, we do not have exports figures, 
                                                          
2 Smith (2001) distinguishes between a “market expansion effect” and a “market power effect” due to stricter 
enforcement of IPRs. The former holds that strong IPRs expand foreign markets available for servicing by ensuring 
exclusive rights over knowledge that flows to the foreign country. The latter holds that strong IPRs reduce 
investment by ensuring a temporary monopoly over the protected knowledge. See also discussion in section 3.
3 According to Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) patents are considered by firms as one of the less effective means to 
protect their intellectual property. This is especially true for process innovations, the ones we consider in the paper. 5
so our analysis is limited to technology transfer modes which imply the transfer of production in 
the recipient country; second, we have data of only one industry, so that the extent to which our 
results can be exported to other industries remains unclear.
2. Theoretical Background
Most of the theoretical work on international technology transfer has been spurred by Dunning’s 
“eclectic paradigm” (Dunning, 1981). Such a paradigm suggests that firms locate production 
abroad when there are “location” advantages in doing so. These advantages might be due to trade 
barriers, cheap factors of production, transport costs and the like (see among others, Motta, 
1992). However, “location” advantages do not need foreign direct investment to materialize. 
Arm’s length arrangements such as licensing might work as well. The choice between the two 
depends of what Dunning labels “internalization advantages”. Applying the insights of the 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1991), this approach suggests that, absent significant 
contracting hazards, the ‘default’ low-cost governance mechanism is a simple contract. However, 
writing and executing a reliable contract for the use of technology requires adequate specification 
of property rights, monitoring and enforcement of contractual terms – any of which may be 
problematic.
In Ethier (1986), Horstmann and Markusen (1996) and Wright (1993) the presence of asymmetric 
information between the technology holder and the potential licensee generates costs which could 
be avoided through a wholly owned subsidiary. In Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Fosfuri 
(2000) the threat of imitation might induce the investor to internalize production and, in some 
cases, to resort to exports. 
There are basically no formal models which explicitly incorporate risk. In Wheeler and Mody 
(1991) the expected profits of undertaking a foreign direct investment are negative related to the 
level of country risk so that higher risk implies less investment. Baven and Estrin (2000) develop 
a simple model where again risk affects negatively expected profits of multinational investment.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
So, in light of their findings, the fact that changes in patent protection do not affect international technology flows 6
The relationship between risk and investment is straightforward. Other things being equal, higher 
risk reduces the expected profits from the investment and hence the propensity to invest. So, one 
should expect a reduction in the expected profits of any of the three forms of international 
technology transfer analyzed here. This is straightforward in the case of wholly owned 
operations, where the investor is the residual claimant of all possible profits, and in the case of 
joint-ventures, where the investor typically receives a share of the whole profits, but it is also true 
for licensing, where royalties and other types of payments tend to be, although spuriously, related 
to the expected profits obtainable through the exploitation of the technology.
If one assumes that the outside best option for the investor (it could be not investing at all or 
exporting) is independent of (or less respondent to) changes in country risk, then the following 
proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 1: The flows of technology transfer into a given country is negatively related 
to the level of country risk.
Notice that this does not imply the all three forms of technology transfer (wholly owned 
operations, joint-ventures, and licensing) increase when the level of country risk decreases. 
Indeed, the three modes involve a very different level of resource commitment. By resource 
commitment we mean dedicated assets that cannot be redeployed to alternative uses without cost 
(loss of value). These assets may be tangible (e.g. physical plant) or intangible (e.g. management 
know-how). In the case of licensing, the licensee bears most of the costs of opening up and 
serving the foreign market. In the case of a wholly owned operation, the investor has to bear all 
the costs. The level of resource commitment consistent with a joint venture will fall somewhere 
between these two extremes.
Where country risk is high, the investor might be well advised to limit its exposure to it by 
reducing its resource commitments and increasing its ability to exit from the market quickly 
without taking a substantial loss should the environment worsen. This in itself suggests that, other 
things being equal, licensing and joint-ventures will be favored over wholly owned operations 
when country risk is high.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
does not appear to be too surprising.7
This implies that higher country risk has a clear negative effect on the flow of wholly owned 
operations. The effect on joint-ventures and licensing is less straightforward. For instance, 
consider licensing. From the one hand, we have argued above that the expected profits from 
licensing tend to reduce with risk, so do the incentives to employ this mode of technology 
transfer. On the other hand, higher risk might force international investors to opt for modes with 
reduced resource commitment. This might increase the flow of licensed technology. The net 
result is ambiguous and licensing flows theoretically might either increase or decrease with 
country risk. What is unambiguous is that the coefficient of country risk on licensing flows must 
be smaller than the coefficient of country risk on flows of wholly owned operations. A similar 
argument could be put forward for joint-ventures.
Proposition 2: The impact of a reduction in country risk on the flow of wholly owned 
operations is larger than the impact on the flow of joint-ventures that, in turn, is larger than 
the impact on the flow of technology licensing.
3. Model Specification and Data
4.1. Specification
We assume that technology transfer flows are a function of a set of country variables which could 
account for the demand of technology in a given country (Di), of country risk (Ri) and of some 
distortion parameters (Pi):
TFi=f(Di, Ri, Pi), (1)
where i is the country subscript.
Among the country variables we shall include income per capita, population and distance. These 
three variables are intended to capture respectively for relative endowments, market size and 
transportation costs. Markusen (1995) provides a survey of models that generate these core 
explanatory variables, which are consistent with the so called gravity model. These variables are 
also used in Smith (2001), Brainard (1997) and Primo Braga and Fink (1998) among others. In 
addition, we introduce a measure of the country level of education. This measure is intended to 8
control both for the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the country and for the imitative abilities of the 
domestic firms. 
Finally as distortion parameters, we have considered the country openness to trade and the degree 
of protection of IPRs.
4
We apply the following specification: 
ijt it it it it i it it ijt HUMAN OPEN IPR R DIST PCGDP POP TF e a
a a a a a a a 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0 = (2)
where the subscript i denotes the country, the subscript t denotes the time period, and the 
subscript j denotes the mode of technology transfers (wholly owned, joint-venture or licensing). 
POP is the population of the country, PCGDP is the per capita income, DIST is the weighted 
distance to capitals of world 20 major exporters, R is country risk, IPR is the degree of patent 
protection, OPEN is openness to trade, HUMAN is a measure of the country level of education, 
and  ijt e  is a log normally distributed error term. Tijt takes the form of separate (not summed) 
wholly owned operations, joint-ventures and licensing.
Taking natural logs of equation (2) one obtains the following:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ijt it it it
it i it it ijt
HUMAN OPEN IPR
R DIST PCGDP POP TF
e a a a
a a a a
+ + + +
+ + + + =
ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln
7 6 5
3 2 1 0
(3)
Notice that we do not take the log of OPEN because this variable is a share.
5
Figure 1 summarizes the predicted parameter signs for each form of technology transfer. First, we 
expect a positive parameters on PCGDP and POP in all equations. The theoretical literature lacks 
consensus on whether transportation costs (DIST) and trade barriers (OPEN) increase or decrease 
technology transfer flows. For example, models of substitution behavior predict that firms 
establish affiliates or licenses as a way of skirting barriers to export (the so-called “tariff-jumping 
                                                          
4 We have experimented with several other variables, like barriers to trade of capital goods, participation to free trade 
agreements, tax rates, level of infrastructure, dummies for geographical areas, etc. Most of them showed an 
insignificant coefficient and the inclusion or exclusion did not affect the results reported here. For brevity, we do not 
report these results, which are available upon request from the author.
5 Both IPR and R are indexes which vary on a scale from 0 to 5 (with 5 meaning the highest level of IPRs protection) 
and from 0 to 100 (with 100 meaning the lowest level of country risk) respectively. For IPR we have used 
log(1+IPR). Since for R the minimum value is 4.4 we have simply taken the log. 9
argument”; see Motta, 1992). However, models of complement behavior predict that conditions 
which decrease (increase) exports also decrease (increase) technology transfer modes which 
involve location in the foreign country (Smith, 2001). We have already said that country risk has 
a positive impact of wholly owned operations in the recipient economy (in the sense that less risk 
- larger values of R - increases the amount of investments). However, the effect on joint-ventures 
and especially on licensing remain ambiguous. As far as it concerns IPRs the effect of changes in 
the strength of protection on any form of technology transfer considered here is far from being 
clear-cut (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Primo-Braga and Fink, 1998; Smith, 2001). From the one 
hand, stronger IPRs enhance the ownership advantage of the source firm in the foreign market by 
providing legal recourse against violations of its assets. This is likely to reduce imitation by 
foreign firms and thus making more appealing the technology transfer activity.  This is known as 
the “market expansion effect”. On the other hand, stronger IPRs also confer to the foreign firm 
more market power, which can be exploited by reducing the supply of products, by rising the 
price, and restricting the investment in the recipient country.  This is known as the “market power 
effect”. Finally, the sign of HUMAN is also ambiguous. The level of education might capture the 
“absorptive capacity” of the recipient country (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). In this case, better 
educated workers available in the host country would facilitate both the creation of a wholly 
owned activity, the establishment of a joint-venture with a local partner and the transmission of 
technological knowledge to any potential licensee. However, higher level of education – better 
technological skills – might imply that local firms are better equipped for quickly imitating the 
technology of the foreign company. This means that the investor will try to protect its 
technology, reduce if possible any technological leakage, and ultimately restrict the amount of 
investment and technology transfer to the recipient country (Fosfuri, 2000; Fosfuri, Motta and 
Roende, 2001). 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
4.2. Data
Data on international technology flows are obtained from Chemical Age Project File (CAPF), a 
large commercial database on worldwide investments in chemical plants during the period 1981-10
1991. For each chemical plant, the database reports both the name of the operating company and 
the name of the licensor when the technology used in the plant is bought from an unaffiliated 
source. In addition, it identifies when the property of a given plant is shared among different 
firms.
6 In other words, using our database it is possible to trace back the entire set of wholly-
owned and joint-venture plants in foreign countries and the whole flow of international 
technology licensing in the chemical industry during the period under study. The database also 
provides information about plant investment costs.
In order to identify the plants belonging to each technology transfer mode, we have constructed a 
sample of large chemical firms. Such firms, given their large financial, managerial and 
organizational capabilities, were likely to have the option to decide the preferred mode of 
technology transfer in any recipient country. Small chemical firms and, in particular, specialized 
engineering firms (SEFs)
7, which are also quite active in international technology licensing, have 
to restrict their strategy space to whether they want to license or not. Since we would like to 
consider a framework where the mode of technology transfer is a decision variable for the 
investor (i.e. the foreign firm endowed with the technology), our sample is better suited for the 
type of analysis we are going to perform.
Our sample includes all chemical firms from developed countries (Western Europe, USA and 
Canada, and Japan) which had, by the year 1988, more than $1 billion in aggregate sales (the list 
of firms is obtained from Aftalion, 1989). Of this set of firms only 142 had at least one 
international technology transfer scored in CAPF in the period under study. These are the firms 
we use in our study. By nationality, we have 64 US firms, 1 Canadian firm, 28 Japanese and 49 
                                                          
6 Although the database shows the names of different firms when the plant is co-owned, it does not systematically 
report the distributions of shares among co-owners. In addition, we believe that co-ownership of plants is 
underreported in the database. For instance, cases of minority participation are not reported. Notice also that other 
studies refer to foreign direct investment as any participation larger than 10%. Under this definition, it is likely that 
all wholly owned and joint-venture plants in our database would belong to the foreign direct investment category. 
We have estimated a model with only two technology transfer modes, foreign direct investment and licensing. 
Results do not change significantly.
7 SEFs are firms specialized in the design, engineering and construction of chemical plants, with no roots in 
manufacturing. SEFs originated as an American phenomenon and some of them were founded very early after the 
war or even in the 1920s. Although their expertise is on the design and engineering of chemical plants, they are also 
very active in the licensing market. With some prominent exceptions such as UOP and Halcon/Scientific Design, 11
European firms. We think that overall the sample includes companies which have the option (i.e. 
financial and managerial capabilities) to switch from one entry mode to another depending on 
country characteristics. Table 1 shows the list of the most active firms in technology transfer 
during the period under study.
TABLE 1 ABOUR HERE
The sample is representative of the population of international technology transfers in the 
chemical industry. Firms of our sample cover close to 60% of all foreign direct investments in the 
period (either wholly owned or joint-venture) and more than one third of international licensing 
agreements. A big chunk of international licensing is undertaken by SEFs (about two fifths). As 
we discussed in footnote 7, these are firms focussed on the design, engineering and construction 
of chemical plants with no downstream production facilities. The only option to profit from their 
innovations is through licensing.
Table 2 shows the distribution of technology transfers by the firms of our sample across 
geographical areas during the period 1981-1991.
8 The table reports both the number of 
transactions and the total value of investment generated by such transactions.
Notice that licensing is the predominant mode of technology transfer in most third world areas 
(the only exception is South America). On the contrary, licensing accounts for less than 20% in 
most developed areas. Here, the exception is Japan where more than 40% of the inflow of 
technology is through licensing. As a remark to this table it is worthwhile noting that the popular 
wisdom on IPRs holds that countries where protection is the strongest tend to have the largest 
share of technology transferred through market-mediated mechanisms such as licensing. 
However, our data seem to suggest that developed countries which have typically the best 
protection of intellectual property tend to show foreign direct investment as the predominant 
mode of technology transfer. Other factors should be therefore accounted for this empirical 
finding. Country risk might be one of such factor. Licensing implies a smaller investment and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
SEFs do not focus on breakthrough innovation. However, they improve and modify processes developed by chemical 
firms and offer those for licensing. See Arora and Gambardella (1998) and Arora and Fosfuri (2000).
8 We have also looked at the technology transfer pattern of firms with different nationality. US and European firms 
(globally taken) tend to behave similarly with about 25% of licensing activity. Japanese firms have a stronger 
attitude towards licensing which accounts for 60% of their international technology transfer activity.12
thus it is better suited for countries where the risk is high (i.e. Eastern Europe, Middle East, 
Africa).
9
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Finally, there is also some variation across sectors according to the predominant mode of 
technology transfer. For instance, sectors like Plastics and Industrial Gases show licensing as the 
most used mode of technology transfer. On the other extreme, in Pharmaceutics and Organic 
Chemicals wholly owned operations account for more than 90% and 75% respectively. See Table 
3. This suggests that there might be factors related to the technology which could be lost at a 
country-level aggregation. Some technology might be more standardized, easier to transfer 
through contracts (Kogut and Zander, 1993) or there might exist more competition in the 
licensing market (see Arora and Fosfuri, 2002). All these factors favor a more extensive use of 
licensing as a mode of international technology transfer. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
We aggregated our data on technology flows in three time periods: 1981-1983, 1984-1987, 1988-
1991. Hence, we shall use the subindex t=1,2,3 for each of the three periods respectively. There 
are three reasons for such aggregation. First, some country variables tend to change slowly so that 
they do not basically show variability from one year to another. Second, from the decision to 
pursue a technology transfer and the actual investment it typically takes several months or years. 
So, technology transfer decisions tend to be more correlated to long run changes rather than short 
run changes in country conditions. Third, in many countries (especially, the smaller ones) and for 
many years the flows of technology transfers would be zero. In addition, such aggregation would 
make us much more confident on the reliability of the information about the year of construction 
or expected construction of the plant that CAPF reports. We have also run our estimations 
pooling all data in a single cross-section. Results do not change and such regressions are 
available upon request from the author.
All our explanatory variables that have time variability have been measured at the beginning of 
each time period. The only exception is our measure of IPRs which was only available for the 
                                                          
9 Restrictions to foreign capital might also play an important role here.13
year 1980, 1985 and 1990 (we have therefore assumed that these correspond respectively to our 
three periods).
We use a set of 71 countries for which we could collect comparable data on the characteristics
described above. The list of countries is reported in the appendix. We have therefore a panel of 
213 observations. Notice that the cross-time variability is quite modest for some country 
variables (like for instance IPRs). For others, like risk, is much more important.
For POP, PCGDP and OPEN we have used the Penn world tables (which are available on-line at 
http://datacentre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/). DIST and HUMAN have been obtained from Barro-
Lee (1994).
10
We measure the strength of IPRs using an index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997). This 
index uses a coding scheme applied to national patent laws, where five categories are considered: 
extent of coverage, membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of 
protection, enforcement mechanisms and duration of protection. One limitation of this measure is 
that it is based on statutory protection, which might actually differ from the real protection 
(whether patent laws are enforced or not). We have also experimented with the index developed 
by Rapp and Rozek (1990). This index is only available for the mid 80s and reflects the 
conformity of national patent laws with minimum standards proposed by the US Chamber of 
Commerce. Both indexes are highly correlated and using one instead of the other does not affect 
any of the results we shall show below.
As a proxy of country risk we used the institutional investor credit ratings. Institutional investor 
credit ratings are based on a survey of leading international bankers who are asked to rate each 
country on a scale from zero to 100 (where 100 represents maximum creditworthiness). Factors 
which are taken into consideration in this measure include the economic and political outlook, 
debt service, financial reserves, fiscal policy, access to capital market, trade balance and 
investments. Surprisingly, Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1996) notice that such index has a higher 
correlation with a measure of political risk rather than a measure of financial risk both developed 
by the Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). In our estimation, to 
                                                          
10 Available on-line at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/Growth/barlee.htm.14
assess the sensitivity of the results we also use a weighted average of the political, economic and 
financial risks developed by the ICRG. This measure is only available starting from the mid 80s. 
We find that our results are robust with respect to the choice of measure. The institutional 
investor credit ratings have been used by Baven and Estrin (2000) to assess the impact of country 
risk on foreign direct investment in a set of transition economies. Other papers, like Wheeler and 
Mody (1991), have used more complex measures of country risk. We favor an approach in which 
the country risk is proxied by information actually available to firms at the time of the investment 
decision – the credit rating – which can be purchased commercially.
Finally, we include DUM1 and DUM2, two dummy variables, which should control for time 
period fixed effects.15
Table 4 summarizes our variables along with their source, whereas Table 5 provides some basic 
descriptive statistics.
TABLE 4 AND TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
5. Empirical results
Table 6 (model 1) reports the OLS estimation of equation (3) where the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the sum of the investment generated by any of the three modes of technology 
transfer (wholly owned operations, joint-ventures and licensing) in country i in period t. In other 
words, we are proxing the flows of technology transfer by the value of investment that 
technology transfer ultimately generates in the recipient economy. Using number of plants 
instead of dollar values gives very similar results.
11
Results are as expected. Both POP and PCGDP have a positive and significant effect on the total 
flow of technology transfer. DIST is positive, suggesting that transportation costs favor location 
of production in distant countries, but barely significant. OPEN is positive and significant at the 
10% level, meaning that more open countries tend to attract larger international flows of 
technology. IPR does not seem to play any role in conditioning the volume of technology 
transfer. HUMAN is also no significant at all. 
The coefficient of R is positive and highly significant. This implies that increases in the country 
credit ratings, our proxy for country risk, generate a larger flow of technology transfer in the 
recipient economy. In dollar terms, this means that, in the average recipient country, a 10% 
increase in R with respect to the mean (about 46) generates an increment in the investment driven 
by international technology transfer of about $50 million a year.
We have also performed a Tobit estimation (model 1a) of equation (3). Indeed, about a third of 
the observations for our dependent variable shows no investment at all in a given country and for 
a given time period. A Tobit estimation should account for the truncated (at zero) dependent 
variable. Qualitative results hold unchanged.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
                                                          
11 Regressions are available from the author upon request.16
As we discussed in section 3, the fact the IPR has no effect on international technology transfer is 
not in contradiction with the theory. Indeed, stronger IPRs generate a market expansion effect 
and a market power effect. Since the former is positive and the latter is negative, the net effect is 
ambiguous. However, one can refine the theory a bit more. As suggested by Smith (2001), the 
risk of imitation is higher in countries with strong imitative abilities. Hence, one should expect 
that it is in these countries that the market expansion effect is stronger. Instead, in countries with 
poor imitative abilities an increase in IPRs protection would reinforce the market power of the 
investor and could possibly lead to a reduction in the flow of technology transfer.
In order to test this additional implication of the theory we divide all our countries in two groups: 
countries with strong imitative abilities and countries with weak imitative abilities. We use the 
median of HUMAN to separate the two groups. Then, we define two dummy variables: 
DWEAK, which takes the value of one if the country has weak imitative abilities and zero 
otherwise; DSTRONG, which takes the value of one if the country has strong imitative abilities 
and zero otherwise. Finally, we estimate an equation where these two dummies are multiplied by 
the variable IPR.
12 Results are reported in Table 6, Model 2 for OLS and Model 2a for Tobit. As 
one can check, we again do not find any evidence of a significant impact of changes in IPRs 
protection on the flow of technology transfer. However, this does not mean that individual modes 
of technology transfer are not affected by changes in IPRs protection. An increase in licensing 
could be leveled out by a similar decrease in wholly owned operations giving a no significant 
coefficient in Table 6. We shall explore this possibility below.
We can now analyze the impact of our main explanatory variables on any single form of 
technology transfer, taking into consideration the simultaneous character of the three modes. The 
empirical method is to estimate equation (3) for the three modes of technology transfer using 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) techniques. Table 7, model 3a, reports the results of the 
SUR estimations of equation (3).
                                                          
12 As a sensitive test we have also used the number of R&D scientists and engineers per million of population to 
define weak and strong imitative abilities. Countries with a number lower than 500 were considered as poor imitators 
whereas countries with more than 500 where considered as good imitators. We found again no significance in the 
coefficients for IPRs protection.17
Overall the results seem to confirm the theoretical predictions discussed in section 3. POP and 
PCGDP are positive and significant in all equations. DIST is positive, but significant only for the 
JV and LIC equations, whereas OPEN is only significant and positive in the WO equation. The 
latter finding might suggest that more open countries tend to attract larger flows of wholly owned 
operations. HUMAN is positive and significant at the 10% level in the WO equation and negative 
and significant in the LIC equation. Taking at its face value this implies that “absorptive 
capacity” plays a more important role in wholly owned operations, whereas the threat of imitation 
in countries with strong imitative abilities might reduce the inward flow of technology licensing. 
IPR does not have a significant effect in any of the three modes of technology transfer. R is 
positive and highly significant in all equations, but in the JV equation. The coefficient is slightly 
larger for WO than for LIC. In dollar terms, this means that, in the average country, a 10% 
improvement in the risk rating with respect to the mean generates a rise in investment due to 
wholly owned operations and licensing of respectively $35 and $14 million per year.
Table 7, model 3b, distinguishes between countries with strong imitative abilities and countries 
with weak imitative abilities. All coefficients remain basically unchanged. Our data do not seem 
to suggest that there exist a market expansion effect and a market power effect due to stronger 
IPRs. Indeed, the only significant coefficient for IPR is in the LIC equation in the case of 
countries with strong imitative abilities. The coefficient (significant at the 10% level) is negative 
suggesting that in countries with strong imitative abilities an increase in the protection of IPRs 
leads to a reduction in the flow of licensed technology.
13
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5.1 Extension: Modeling the decision about the technology transfer mode
The previous section has shown that higher levels of country risk reduce the flows of technology 
transfer in whatever mode they take place. In section 3, we have argued that firms facing higher 
risk might opt for technology transfer modes which entail a lower level of resource commitment: 
they might prefer to maintain flexibility in case things turn to worsen in the host country. So, a 
                                                          
13 Using the number of researchers and engineers per million of population instead of HUMAN yields a very similar 
result.18
higher level of risk might imply the substitution of some wholly owned operations with some 
more market-based alternatives, such as licensing. We have shown that such effect exists but it is 
no enough to overturn the reduction in investment due to higher risk, so that flows of technology 
licensing respond negatively to country risk as well.
Since our data allow us to trace back firms’ decisions at the plant level, we can offer more 
evidence of the substitution effect that we have explicitly formalized in proposition 2. Indeed, we 
can construct a model where the probability of choosing a given mode for the transfer of the 
technology depends on the set of explanatory variables we discussed and used in the previous 
section. If the theory is correct, higher level of risk should increase (decrease) the probability of 
modes of technology transfer which entail lower (higher) resource commitment. In other words, 
higher risk ratings should increase the probability to choose a wholly owned operation and 
decrease the probability to select a licensing contract for the transfer of the technology.
Table 8 shows the results of three different estimations of this probabilistic formulation. Model 
4a is a multinomial logit estimation, where we treat separately the three modes of technology 
transfer, model 4b is an ordered logit, which takes into consideration that wholly owned 
operations represent the highest level of integration and licensing contracts the lowest, and model 
4c is a simple logit where we only consider the two polar categories: wholly owned operations 
and licensing.
14
In addition to the variables used in section 5 we can now also control for firm-specific and 
technology-specific sources of variation. In the former case, we introduce the variable 
TURNOVER to control for the size of the investor. Also, notice that we have relabelled the 
variable DISTANCE as PROXIMITY. Indeed, this variable captures now the geographical 
proximity between the country where the investor has located its head quarters and the recipient 
country. In the latter case, we introduce a set of dummies which correspond to an aggregation of 
all technologies in 9 broad sectors, and the variables PATENTS and SEFS.
15 PATENTS is the 
                                                          
14 As we discussed above the way our database reports the information about joint-ventures is unclear, so we thought 
that dropping this category was a plausible choice. However, we have also run a logit regression in which we merged 
together wholly-owned operations with joint-ventures obtaining very similar results.
15 We use the following sector dummies: Oil Refining, Petrochemicals, Minerals & Metallurgy, Plastics & Rubber, 
Inorganic Chemicals, Agriculture (include Fertilizers), Gas (include Gas Handling, Air Separation and Industrial 19
number of patents issued on a given technology by the US Patent Office in the period under 
study. This variable should account for the complexity of the technology, with higher values 
associated to more complex technologies. SEFS is the number of SEFs that have licensed that 
given technology in the period under study. SEFs’ licensing activity tends to be concentrated in 
more standardized and less innovative technologies. (See section 4.2 for a brief discussion on 
SEFs and, for more details, Arora and Gambardella, 1998, and Arora and Fosfuri, 2000.) Hence, 
large values of SEFS should be associated to standard technologies which are more codified as 
well.
Results from all models seem to suggest that higher levels of risk reduce the probability to use a 
wholly owned operation to exploit a technology in a foreign country. So, firms respond to risk 
with technology transfer modes which entail smaller resource commitment.
Other variables seem to have the expected sign. Wholly owned operations tend to be chosen in 
geographical proximate countries, with higher level of education and per capita income. 
Licensing is more likely to be chosen for more standardized and less innovative technologies 
(larger values of SEFS) and simpler technologies (smaller values of PATENTS).
Stronger IPRs protection seems to have a positive impact on the probability to observe licensing, 
although this effect if far from being significant. All in all, this makes us a bit more confident 
about the result we obtained in section 4: changes in the degree of patent protection have almost 
no effect on the decision about which means a firm uses to exploit its technology in a foreign 
country.
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6. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the relationship between international technology flows and country risk. 
Although some empirical evidence exists on the effect of country risk on foreign direct 
investment, little is known about the effect of country risk on other modes of technology transfer 
such as joint-ventures and licensing.
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Gases), Organic Chemicals (include Explosives, Textile and Fibers, Food Products and Pharmaceuticals) and 
Miscellaneous (the rest).20
Our paper shows that the whole flow of technology transfer into a recipient economy is negative 
related to the level of country risk. Moreover, this effect holds for all technology transfer modes 
considered in our analysis, namely wholly owned operations, joint-ventures and licensing. 
Finally, we are also able to show that the relative effect is stronger for technology transfer modes 
which involve greater commitment with the recipient country, such as wholly owned operations. 
In sum, higher levels of country risk mean less technology transfer, that tends to be more market-
based.
By contrast, we do not find evidence of a significant effect of IPRs protection on international 
technology transfers. Although surprising, this finding has some plausible justifications. First, our 
measure of patent protection reflects mainly statutory protection which might actually differ from 
the real protection (whether patent laws are enforced or not). Second, as reported by Cohen, 
Nelson and Walsh (2000) firms do not rate patents as very effective in protecting their process 
innovations. Finally, even if different degrees of patent protection do not affect neither the 
volume nor the composition of international technology flows, they might still affect the type of 
technology which is transferred (Fosfuri, 2000). With our data, we are not able to investigate this 
possibility.
At their face value, our results suggest that governments in less developed countries keen to 
attract foreign technology should pay greater attention to the quality of the business environment 
and to investment conditions rather than offering more statutory protection to IPRs. Needless to 
say that improving country risk ratings is neither easy nor rapid. A statutory change in patent 
protection or the formal participation to an international IPRs agreement are much more easy 
policies to implement. However, our paper shows they are not very effective.
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Appendix
List of countries used in the empirical estimations: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany (West), Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, 
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S.A., Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.23
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Predicted parameter signs
Variable Abbreviation Wholly Owned Joint-Venture Licensing
Population POP Positive Positive Positive
Income Per Capita PCGDP Positive Positive Positive
Distance DIST Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous
Openness to Trade OPEN Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous
Country Risk R Positive Ambiguous Ambiguous
IPRs Protection IPR Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous
Level of Education HUMAN Ambiguous Ambiguous Ambiguous24
Table 1: Top 20 firms involved in international technology transfers (by number of plants) in the 
chemical industry during the 1981-1991.
Company Nationality Total WO (rank) JV (rank) LIC (rank)
Shell Anglo-Dutch 492 264 (1) 119 (1) 109 (4)
ICI British 243 117 (5) 13 (15) 113 (2)
Exxon American 223 164 (2) 26 (8) 33 (19)
Hoechst German 214 131 (4) 36 (3) 47 (11)
Air Liquide French 212 92 (8) 4 (30) 116 (1)
BASF German 196 138 (3) 12 (16) 46 (13)
Du Pont American 170 101 (7) 22 (10) 47 (11)
Dow Chemical American 167 109 (6) 36 (3) 22 (25)
BP British 150 79 (9) 27 (6) 44 (14)
Union Carbide American 143 26 (28) 4 (30) 113 (2)
Monsanto American 140 34 (22) 11 (18) 95 (5)
Rhone-Poulenc French 130 60 (11) 18 (12) 52 (7)
Texaco American 104 54 (12) 1 (52) 48 (10)
Mobil American 100 50 (15) 28 (5) 22 (25)
Air Products American 90 29 (26) 1 (52) 60 (6)
Amoco American 88 22 (36) 17 (13) 49 (9)
Montedison Italian 80 21 (39) 24 (9) 35 (16)
BOC British 79 51 (14) 21 (11) 7 (43)
Bayer German 77 62 (10) 3 (37) 12 (34)
Phillips American 75 20 (40) 4 (30) 51 (8)25
Table 2: Distribution of technology flows (number and value) by geographic areas during the 
period1981-1991 in the chemical industry (by the firms of our sample)















































































































Note: Value in billions of US dollars.
Table 3: International technology transfers (number) by selected sectors in the chemical industry 
during the period 1981-1991 (by the firms of our sample)
AS IG OC OR PC PH PL SF+TF
WO 155 (52) 103 (41) 248 (74) 358 (56) 427 (40) 274 (91) 464 (47) 108 (51)
JV 22(8) 15 (7) 34 (10) 79 (12) 197 (16) 9 (3) 148 (16) 23 (11)
LIC 118 (40) 115 (52) 53 (16) 210 (32) 448 (44) 18 (6)  367 (37) 79 (38)
Total 295 223 335 647 1072 301 979 210
Note: AS = Air Separation, IG = Industrial Gases, OC = Organic Chemicals, OR = Oil Refining, 
PC = Petrochemicals, PH = Pharmaceuticals, PL = Plastics, SF+TF = Synthetic Fibers.26
Table 4: Variables and sources
Variable Description Source
ALLit Investment in country i and period t generated by any of three 
modes of technology transfer (measured in millions of US dollars)
Chemintell (1991)
WOit Investment in country i and period t generated by technology 
transfer through wholly owned operations (measured in millions of 
US dollars)
Chemintell (1991)
JVit Investment in country i and period t generated by technology 
transfer through joint-ventures (measured in millions of US 
dollars)
Chemintell (1991)
LICit Investment in country i and period t generated by technology 
transfer through licensing (measured in millions of US dollars)
Chemintell (1991)
POPit Population in country i at the beginning of period t (in thousands) Penn World Table
PCGDPit (Real) per capita income in country i at the beginning of period t 
(in dollars)
Penn World Table
DISTi Weighted distance of country i’s capital to capitals of 20 major 
exporters (in kilometers)
Barro and Lee (1994)
HUMANit Averaged schooling years in the total population over age 25 in 
country i at the beginning of period t 
Barro and Lee (1994)
OPENit (Exports + Imports)/GDP at current international prices in country 
i at the beginning of period t
Penn World Table
IPRit Strength of patent protection in country i at period t. This is an 
index which accounts for the extent of patent coverage, 
membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss 
of protection, enforcement mechanisms and duration of protection
Park and Ginarte (1997)
Rit Global index of risk in country i at the beginning of period t Institutional Investor 
Credit Rating
DUM1 Dummy variables equal to 1 for the period 1984-1987 and 0 
otherwise
Chemintell (1991)
DUM2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if for the period 1988-1991 and 0 
otherwise
Chemintell (1991)27
Table 5: Descriptive statistics (n = 213)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ALLit 1458,5 2813,4 0 16402
WOit 901,0 2150,2 0 13924
JVit 160,2 385,8 0 2772
LICit 397,3 663,1 0 3740
POPit 37394 97180 228 849515
PCGDPit 5804 5185 264 21827
DISTi 5861 2440 1267 11500
HUMANit 5,1 2,8 0,5 12,1
OPENit 66,5 50,5 10,5 423,4
IPRit 2,58 0,94 0 4,52
Rit 46,1 27,4 4,4 98,6
DUM1 0,33 0,47 0 1
DUM2 0,33 0,47 0 128
Table 6: OLS and Tobit estimations: ALLit
OLS: ALLit TOBIT: ALLit





















































































Number of obs. 213 213 213
Left-censored 70 70
Adjusted R2 0.639 0.642
Pseudo R2 0.210 0.211
Note: Standard Errors are shown in parenthesis. *10%, **5%, ***1%.29
Table 7: SUR estimations
Model 3a
WOij JVij LICij
Constant -27.947*** -34.921*** -25.138***
POPit 1.221*** 0.893*** 1.099***
PCGDPit 0.691** 1.035*** 1.367***
DISTi 0.210 0.180*** 0.656*
HUMANit 0.731* 0.008 -0.878**
OPENit 0.008** 0.000 -0.000
IPRit -0.271 -0.442 -0.565
Rit 1.407*** 0.547 1.327***
DUM1 -0.209 -0.069 0.120
DUM2 -0.243 0.315 -0.051
Number of obs. 213 213 213
R-sq 0.640 0.431 0.570
Model 3b
WOij JVij LICij
Constant -31.669*** -35.856*** -30.380***
POPit 1.209*** 0.891*** 1.081***
PCGDPit 0.720** 1.042*** 1.408***
DISTi 0.206 1.179*** 0.651*
HUMANit 1.154** 0.114 -0.282
OPENit 0.007** 0.000 -0.001
DWEAK*IPRit -0.600 -0.524 -1.028*
DSTRONG*IPRit 0.029 -0.366 -0.142
Rit 1.482*** 0.566 1.433***
DUM1 -0.213 -0.070 0.114
DUM2 -0.242 0.316 -0.050
Number of obs. 213 213 213
R-sq 0.644 0.431 0.579
Note: *10%, **5%, ***1%.30
Table 8: Multinomial logit, ordered logit and logit estimations
Multinomial logit (baseline = WO) Ordered logit Logit
JV LIC 1 = WO, 2 = JV, 
3 = LIC
1 = WO, 0 = LIC
Constant 1.118** 1.274*** -1.410***
-0.909***
-1.116***
POP 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000***
PCGDP -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
PROXIMITY -1.781*** -0.545*** -0.663*** 0.523***
HUMAN -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
OPEN -0.002 -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.004***
IPR -0.280*** 0.082 0.099 -0.066
R -0.010* -0.009*** -0.008** 0.009**
TURNOVER -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
PATENTS -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.003***
SEFS 0.043** 0.028** 0.028*** -0.026**
Number of obs. 2528 2528 2263
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.091 0.128
Note: *10%, **5%, ***1%.